Maryland Law Review
Volume 67 | Issue 2

Article 6

Garcetti v. Ceballos: Misconstruing Precedent to
Curtail Government Employees’ First Amendment
Rights
Matthew R. Schroll

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the First Amendment Commons
Recommended Citation
Matthew R. Schroll, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Misconstruing Precedent to Curtail Government Employees’ First Amendment Rights, 67 Md. L.
Rev. 485 (2008)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/6

This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-2\MLR204.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

4-MAR-08

9:59

Note
GARCETTI v. CEBALLOS : MISCONSTRUING PRECEDENT
TO CURTAIL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES’
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,1 the Supreme Court of the United States
considered whether the First Amendment protects government employees from discipline based on speech made pursuant to their official duties.2 The Court held that the First Amendment does not
protect such speech because government employees speaking in the
context of their employment duties are not speaking as citizens.3 In
so holding, the Court created a bright-line rule that ignored precedent,4 and needlessly adopted an expansive view of the government’s
ability to control speech.5 As a result, the Court threatened the constitutional mandate of Brady v. Maryland 6 and the traditionally broad
protection afforded to academic freedom.7 The Court could have
avoided this outcome if it had adopted Justice Breyer’s approach and
protected speech that raises special constitutional considerations.8
I.

THE CASE

Beginning in 1989, Richard Ceballos was employed as a deputy
district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s office.9
In this capacity, Ceballos had supervisory responsibilities over two to
three deputy district attorneys.10 Ceballos’s “personal commitment to
perform civic work” motivated him to obtain his position.11
In February 2000, the defense attorney for a pending criminal
case contacted Ceballos regarding possible inaccuracies in an affidavit
Copyright  2008 by Matthew R. Schroll.
1. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
2. Id. at 1955.
3. Id. at 1960.
4. See infra Part IV.A.
5. See infra Part IV.B.
6. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
7. See infra notes 208, 224 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part IV.C.
9. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2006).
10. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 2004).
11. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1971 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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for a search warrant.12 He asked Ceballos to review the case and notified Ceballos of a motion he had filed challenging the search warrant.13 Upon investigating the allegations, Ceballos determined that
the affidavit did, indeed, include some factual misrepresentations.14
As a result, Ceballos reported his findings to his supervisors, Carol
Najera and Frank Sundstedt,15 and submitted a memorandum recommending dismissal of the pending criminal case.16 Sundstedt then ordered Ceballos to make the memorandum less accusatory of the
deputy sheriff; Ceballos complied, and rewrote the memorandum.17
After Ceballos submitted the re-written memorandum, Sundstedt held
a meeting that he, Ceballos, Najera, and representatives from the
sheriff’s department, including the warrant affiant, attended.18
Following the meeting, Sundstedt decided to continue with the
prosecution even though he and Najera had initially agreed that the
validity of the warrant was questionable.19 Ceballos informed Najera
that he was constitutionally obligated to disclose his memorandum to
defense counsel in the criminal case.20 Following this disclosure, the
defense called Ceballos as a witness during the hearing on the motion
challenging the warrant, but the trial court nevertheless rejected the
motion.21
After the hearing, Ceballos claimed that his supervisors took a
number of retaliatory actions against him.22 First, Ceballos’s supervi12. Id. at 1955 (majority opinion). The defense attorney believed that one of the deputy sheriffs may have lied to obtain the warrant. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171.
13. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1955. It is not uncommon for defense attorneys to ask calendar deputies to investigate cases that they supervise. Id.
14. Id. In particular, Ceballos thought that what the affidavit referred to as a long
driveway was actually a separate roadway. Id. Ceballos also believed that the roadway’s
composition called into question the affiant’s statement that tire tracks led to the premises
described in the warrant. Id. Specifically, Ceballos found that the roadway’s composition
in some areas was such that it would be nearly impossible to create visible tire tracks. Id.
15. Najera was Ceballos’s immediate supervisor. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171. Sundstedt
was the head deputy district attorney at the time. Id.
16. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1955–56.
17. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171.
18. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1956. The meeting allegedly became contentious and one
representative from the sheriff’s department criticized Ceballos for his work on the case.
Id.
19. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171. Sundstedt decided to proceed pending the outcome of
the defense counsel’s motion challenging the search warrant. Id.
20. Id.
21. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1956; Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171. During the hearing, Ceballos
was unable to provide the court with some of his conclusions as to the accuracy of the
warrant because of objections raised by the prosecution. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171. The
trial judge ultimately denied the motion because other grounds existed to support probable cause. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1972 (Souter, J., dissenting).
22. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1956.

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-2\MLR204.txt

2008]

unknown

GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS

Seq: 3

4-MAR-08

9:59

487

sors demoted him from calendar deputy to trial deputy.23 Second,
they forced him to either accept this demotion or transfer to another
courthouse, which would have significantly lengthened his commute.24 Next, his supervisors reassigned his only murder case at the
time to another deputy district attorney with no experience in such
cases, and barred Ceballos from working on murder cases in the future.25 Finally, Ceballos alleged that Najera became “rude and hostile” towards him at the trial, and that Sundstedt gave him the “silent
treatment.”26
Based on these retaliatory actions, Ceballos filed an employment
grievance, which was denied on a finding of no retaliation.27 He subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.28 Ceballos alleged
that the defendants’ retaliation against him violated his First Amendment rights.29
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, holding that Ceballos’s memorandum was not protected
speech under the First Amendment.30 The court reasoned that Ceballos’s speech occurred within the scope of his employment duties and
was not, therefore, the speech of a concerned citizen.31 In denying
Ceballos’s claim, the court relied on precedent from other federal
courts of appeals, which held that the First Amendment does not protect employee speech created pursuant to an individual’s employment
duties.32
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed this grant of summary judgment and held that Ceballos’s memorandum constituted protected speech under the First Amendment.33
The court engaged in a two-step analysis to determine: (1) whether
23. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171.
24. Id. at 1171 & n.2.
25. Id. at 1171–72.
26. Id. at 1171.
27. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1956.
28. Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. CV 00-11106 AHM (AJWx), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039,
at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002). The statute under which Ceballos sued provides a cause of
action in federal court for citizens who suffer a deprivation of their constitutional rights.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
29. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1956. Defendants included Najera, Sundstedt, and then-District Attorney Gil Garcetti. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1172.
30. Ceballos, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039, at *20–22.
31. Id. at *15–19 & n.5.
32. Id. at *16–17 (citing Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, 239 F.3d 939, 941 (7th Cir. 2001);
Buazard v. Meredith, 172 F.3d 546, 548–49 (8th Cir. 1999); Thomson v. Scheid, 977 F.2d
1017, 1020 (6th Cir. 1992)).
33. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1180, 1185.
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Ceballos’s speech addressed a matter of public concern; and, if so, (2)
whether Ceballos’s interest in expressing his speech outweighed the
government employer’s interest in maintaining workplace efficiency
and avoiding workplace disruption.34
In rejecting the district court’s per se rule that speech made
within the scope of employment is not entitled to First Amendment
protection, the Ninth Circuit examined the content of the speech at
issue.35 Focusing its inquiry on whether the content and purpose of
the speech raised an issue of public concern, or simply expressed a
private or personal interest, the appellate court found that Ceballos’s
memorandum was inherently a matter of public concern.36 The
Ninth Circuit then determined that Ceballos’s interests outweighed
those of his employer because the defendants had offered no evidence as to how Ceballos’s memorandum caused inefficiency or office
disruption.37 As a result, the appellate court concluded that Ceballos’s individual interests, combined with the public’s interest in
whistleblowing, outweighed the defendants’ administrative interests.38
In a special concurrence, Judge O’Scannlain agreed that circuit
precedent controlled the Ninth Circuit’s decision, but contended that
the court should have overruled this precedent.39 Judge O’Scannlain
criticized the majority’s decision as focusing exclusively on the content of the speech and ignoring the distinction between an individual
who makes speech as an employee and as a citizen.40 He reasoned
that when a government employee speaks in the course of employment, the government essentially owns the speech, and the employee,
therefore, has no personal interest in the content of the speech.41
Thus, Judge O’Scannlain would not have extended First Amendment
34. Id. at 1173.
35. Id. at 1174–75, 1177. The court of appeals noted that such a rule would create an
anomaly by affording protection to employees who speak publicly, but not to those who
express their views privately to their supervisors. Id. at 1176.
36. Id. at 1174. Specifically, in reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals relied on
circuit precedent holding that whistleblowing speech is a matter of public concern. Id.
(citing Blair v. City of Pomona, 223 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000); Johnson v. Multnomah
County, 48 F.3d 420, 425 (9th Cir. 1995)). Defendants conceded that Ceballos’s speech
constituted whistleblowing. Id.
37. Id. at 1179–80. The court also found it especially unlikely that Ceballos’s speech
resulted in disruption given that Ceballos had acted pursuant to his employment duties.
Id. at 1180.
38. Id. at 1180.
39. Id. at 1185 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring specially).
40. Id. at 1187.
41. Id. at 1189.

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-2\MLR204.txt

2008]

unknown

GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS

Seq: 5

4-MAR-08

9:59

489

protection to the speech at issue because it was spoken by Ceballos as
a public employee, not as a citizen.42
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to decide “whether the First Amendment protects a government employee
from discipline based on speech made pursuant to the employee’s official duties.”43
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
Congress from “abridging the freedom of speech.”44 The Supreme
Court of the United States uses a two-part test to determine when the
First Amendment protects the speech of government employees from
employer retaliation.45 First, to merit constitutional protection, an individual must speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern.46 Second, the employee’s interest in expressing opinions as a citizen must
outweigh the government’s interest in preventing workplace disruption and inefficiency.47 However, the government may nevertheless
control the content of speech when it provides funds to convey a
programmatic message with a particular purpose.48
A. The Connick Inquiry: Analyzing Whether an Employee Speaks as a
Citizen on a Matter of Public Concern
The Supreme Court first explicitly enunciated the threshold inquiry for determining when the First Amendment protects a public
employee’s speech in Connick v. Myers.49 Connick involved an assistant
district attorney, Myers, who opposed her transfer to a different section of a criminal court.50 Myers voiced her opposition to her supervisors and subsequently created a questionnaire to obtain her
42. See id. at 1193 (noting the distinction between public employees’ speech as citizens
and speech in their role as employees).
43. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2006).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment has been incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359,
368 (1931) (“It has been determined that the conception of liberty under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the right of free speech.” (citing Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925))).
45. See infra notes 46–107 and accompanying text.
46. See infra Part II.A.
47. See infra Part II.B.
48. See infra Part II.C.
49. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
50. Id. at 140.
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colleagues’ views concerning, among other issues, the office transfer
policy, employee morale, and political campaigning by employees.51
The Court made clear that in order to enjoy First Amendment
protection, an employee’s speech must have been made as a citizen
and touch upon a matter of public concern.52 In assessing whether an
employee speaks as a citizen, the Court differentiated between speech
on matters of only personal interest and speech upon which “free and
open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate.”53
To assess whether Myers’s speech expressed a matter of public concern, the Court examined the content, form, and context of her
statements.54
The Court concluded that Myers’s questionnaire, on the whole,
did not address a matter of public concern, but that a question concerning pressure to work for political campaigns did.55 Specifically,
based on the overall context and form of the questionnaire, the Court
reasoned that it clearly reflected an employment dispute, rather than
an individual’s attempt to speak as a citizen.56 However, the Court
explained that the content of the specific question concerning political campaigns implicated heightened individual and societal interests
even though it occurred in the same context as the other questions.57
The Court further explained that Myers’s questionnaire did not merit
51. Id. at 140–41. Specifically, the questionnaire solicited other employees’ opinions
on “office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of
confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns.” Id. at 141.
52. See id. at 147 (holding that when a public employee speaks on a matter of personal
interest, rather than as a citizen on a matter of public concern, a federal court is not the
appropriate forum to review any resulting employment decision). In other words, Connick’s public concern requirement became a threshold inquiry that an employee must overcome before the Court will balance the employee’s interests against the employer’s. See id.
at 146 (explaining that if the speech at issue does not touch on a matter of public concern,
judicial scrutiny of the employer’s action becomes unnecessary).
53. Id. at 145 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571–72 (1968)).
54. Id. at 147–48.
55. Id. at 148–49.
56. Id. at 148. The Court reached this conclusion by stating that Myers did not seek to
make the results of her questionnaire public, did not attempt to expose wrongdoing, and
instead merely demonstrated her dissatisfaction with the transfer proposal. Id.
57. Id. at 149. The Court so concluded because such political pressure can threaten an
employee’s beliefs and involve the employee’s fundamental rights. Id. The Court considered it “essential that public employees be able to speak out freely” on this topic without
fear of retaliatory adverse employment decisions. Id. Furthermore, the Court found that
forcing assistant district attorneys to work in political campaigns endangered society’s interest in having government service based on merit, as opposed to partisan political service.
Id.

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-2\MLR204.txt

2008]

unknown

GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS

Seq: 7

4-MAR-08

9:59

491

constitutional protection simply because its content could have been
of public concern in a different situation.58
Four years after Connick, the Court considered this threshold inquiry again in Rankin v. McPherson59 when an employee made a controversial statement after hearing about an assassination attempt on
the President.60 Upon hearing this news, the employee said to her
colleague: “[I]f they go for him again, I hope they get him.”61 The
employee was subsequently terminated.62 The Court reviewed the
context of the speech and determined that the statement was a matter
of public concern because it occurred while discussing the policies of
the President.63 The Court also pointed out that the statement followed a news bulletin reporting a “matter of heightened public attention.”64 Furthermore, in examining its content, the Court did not
find the employee’s statement to be a punishable threat, which would
have been undeserving of First Amendment protection.65
The Court again considered these factors in 1995 in United States
v. National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU).66 In NTEU, the Court
invalidated a federal law that prohibited a large majority of federal
employees from accepting compensation for speeches or articles, regardless of their content.67 Based on the content, form, and context
factors, the Court determined that the employees made the speech at
issue as citizens on matters of public concern.68 As for the context
58. Id. at 148 n.8. Examination of the context and form factors required the Court to
focus on the content of Myers’s speech in this specific instance, rather than assessing it
abstractly. Id.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan, speaking for three other members of the Court, criticized the majority’s use of form and context to evaluate whether speech addresses a matter
of public concern. Id. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Instead, Justice Brennan would
have applied a more relaxed standard, finding matters to be of public concern if they
“could reasonably be expected to be of interest to persons seeking to develop informed
opinions.” Id. at 163.
59. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
60. Id. at 381, 384.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 382.
63. Id. at 386. Although the Court did not explicitly analyze the form factor, it did
note the private nature of the statement in that the public did not have access to the work
room where the employee made the statement. Id. at 380, 386 n.11.
64. Id. at 386.
65. Id. at 386–87. The Secret Service had investigated the alleged threat and taken no
action. Id. at 387 n.12.
66. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
67. Id. at 457. The Court provided some examples of activities that the ban encompassed, including a mail handler who lectured on religion, an aerospace engineer who
lectured on black history, and a microbiologist who reviewed dance performances. Id. at
461.
68. Id. at 465.
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and form factors, the individuals addressed their speech to public
audiences and did so outside of the workplace.69 Additionally, on the
whole, the content of the speech was unrelated to their employment.70 Thus, the Court held that the speech restricted in NTEU
touched on matters of public concern and did not merely reflect personal comments on employment.71
Nine years later, unlike NTEU, the Court struck down a public
employee’s First Amendment challenge when the government terminated a police officer for speech that occurred outside of the workplace.72 In City of San Diego v. Roe,73 a unanimous Court denied a
police officer’s First Amendment claim when the police department
terminated him for creating a video of himself stripping off a police
uniform.74 In articulating the threshold inquiry, the Court defined
public concern as “something that is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to
the public at the time of publication.”75 Under this definition, the
Court found that the content of the officer’s speech failed to exhibit
any redeeming public purpose, such as informing the public about
the functioning of the police department.76 In examining the context
of the video, the Court concluded that Roe had capitalized on his
official status to take advantage of the police department’s image.77
According to the Court, then, Roe’s speech did not touch on a matter
of public concern, but instead simply impeded the police department’s ability to maintain its professional image, an essential part of
its effectiveness in the community.78

69. Id. at 466.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 79, 84 (2004) (per curiam).
73. 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam).
74. Id. at 78, 84. The police uniform was not the officer’s specific San Diego Police
Department uniform. Id. at 78. Roe sold these custom videos of himself on the Internet.
Id.
75. Id. at 83–84. Despite this definition, the Court also noted that private remarks may
receive constitutional protection, as in Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). Id. at 84.
76. Id. at 84. The Court noted that this speech would still be unprotected under the
relaxed standard announced in Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion to Connick. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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B. The Pickering Balancing Test: Weighing the Interests of the
Employee Against Those of the Employer
In Pickering v. Board of Education,79 the Court announced what is
now the second step that the Court takes in determining when the
First Amendment protects a public employee’s speech.80 Pickering involved a public school teacher who was discharged for writing a letter
to a newspaper that criticized the Board of Education and allegedly
disrupted the efficient operation of the school.81 The Court weighed
the teacher’s First Amendment right to free speech against the public
school’s interest, as an employer, in dismissing the teacher for speech
it found disruptive.82 The Court’s decision sought “a balance between
the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters
of public concern and the interests of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.”83
Applying this rule to the facts of Pickering, the Court found that
the teacher’s letter addressed a topic that a member of the general
public would discuss, and did not comment on a matter closely related to his employment.84 Additionally, the Court noted that the societal interest in having free and open debate weighed in the teacher’s
favor.85 In assessing the interest of the school district, the Court
noted that the Board of Education had introduced no evidence to
support its claims that the letter to the newspaper created controversy
or conflict among the board and teachers.86 As a result, the Court
concluded that the teacher’s interest in expressing his opinions as a
citizen exceeded the board’s interest in preventing disruption or
maintaining workplace efficiency, by limiting this contribution to public debate.87 Thus, the Court concluded that Pickering’s expression
on matters of public importance did not justify the board’s termination of his employment, and hence, the termination was
unconstitutional.88
79. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
80. Id. at 568.
81. Id. at 564. In particular, the teacher criticized a proposed tax increase and the
board’s actions related to similar past proposals. Id.
82. Id. at 568.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 571–72. The Court stated that “whether a school system requires additional
funds is a matter of legitimate public concern.” Id. at 571.
85. Id. at 571–72.
86. Id. at 570. Such evidence would have weighed in the board’s favor by bolstering its
interests as an employer. Id. at 572–73.
87. Id. at 573.
88. Id. at 574–75.
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Eleven years later, the Court expanded Pickering in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District,89 by applying the balancing test to
analyze speech expressed privately.90 In Givhan, a school failed to renew an employment contract with a teacher who expressed concerns
to the principal regarding the school’s racially discriminatory employment policy.91 Although Givhan articulated her concerns to her supervisor privately, the Court afforded her speech First Amendment
protection, and refused to confine the Pickering rule to government
employee speech made in public.92 Due to the increased risk that an
employer may not be able to manage effectively in this situation, however, the Court reasoned that the manner, time, and place of the
speech are factors, in addition to content, that the Pickering balancing
equation must consider.93
In Waters v. Churchill,94 the Court expounded upon the types of
interests and underlying principles that it considers when performing
this balancing.95 Specifically, the Court maintained that the government can more easily restrain employee speech when it acts as an employer, rather than as a sovereign attempting to control the speech of
ordinary citizens, because the government employs individuals to efficiently and effectively further its goals.96 As a result, the Court explained, it gives greater weight to government employment decisions
when they implicate the government’s interest in effective operations.97 Nevertheless, the Court recognized that government employees contribute to robust, public debate because their employment
positions provide them with informed opinions.98 Thus, the Court
noted that the government will often need to make a substantial showing of disruption before it makes adverse employment decisions based
upon such speech.99
89. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
90. Id. at 414–16.
91. Id. at 412–13.
92. Id. at 413, 415–16. In doing so, the Court reversed the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which had held that Pickering did not apply to private expression. Id. at 413.
93. Id. at 415 n.4.
94. 511 U.S. 661 (1994) (plurality opinion).
95. Id. at 671–75.
96. Id. at 675.
97. See id. at 673 (noting that greater deference is afforded to the government’s restrictions on employee speech when the restrictions are aimed at maintaining workplace
order).
98. Id. at 674.
99. Id.
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In Board of County Commissioners, Wabaunsee County v. Umbehr,100
the Court again expanded Pickering by applying its balancing test to a
public employer’s retaliation against an independent contractor.101
Umbehr, an independent contractor, wrote editorials in local newspapers and spoke at meetings where he criticized the Board of County
Commissioners on multiple topics.102 The board subsequently terminated his contract with the county.103 After noting that the interests
of a government employer and an independent contractor differ from
those present in a typical employer-employee relationship, the Court
held that application of the Pickering balancing test would account for
such varied interests.104 Specifically, the Court found the interests of
independent contractors and government employees comparable, but
noted that they may exist to different degrees because of the nature of
the relationship between the independent contractor and the government.105 The Court reasoned that these differences did not justify a
complete denial of First Amendment protection to contractors.106 In
so concluding, the Court stated its preference for a nuanced, balancing approach as opposed to a bright-line rule that would unnecessarily
foreclose First Amendment protection to an entire class.107
C. The Government Has a Limited Ability to Control the Content of
Subsidized Speech
In the public employment context, the government may not deny
an individual a benefit for the exercise of or to induce the relinquishment of the individual’s free speech rights.108 Nevertheless, the government does not violate the First Amendment when it selectively
100. 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
101. Id. at 673.
102. Id. at 671. His criticism related to landfill user rates, the cost of obtaining county
documents, alleged violations by the board, and alleged mismanagement of taxpayers’
money. Id.
103. Id. Umbehr’s contract was for solid waste disposal. Id.
104. Id. at 676–78 (explaining that the Pickering balancing test is fact intensive and can
accommodate such competing interests).
105. Id. at 684 (“Independent government contractors are similar in most relevant respects to government employees, although both the speaker’s and the government’s interests are typically—though not always—somewhat less strong in the independent contractor
case.”).
106. Id. at 678.
107. Id. at 678–79. In this vein, the Court also warned that adopting a bright-line rule
would make First Amendment protection turn on whether the government labeled a person an employee or a contractor, and would leave this distinction open to manipulation.
Id. at 679.
108. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
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funds some speech, but not other speech, to encourage a particular
message or activity.109
A unanimous Court enunciated this distinction in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,110 when it upheld a tax provision
that denied tax exempt status to non-profit organizations engaged in
lobbying.111 After explaining that a tax exemption is equivalent to a
government subsidy, the Court determined that Congress had merely
made a policy decision not to fund the lobbying activities of non-profit
organizations.112 The Court reasoned that the denial did not force
the organizations to forego their non-lobbying activities, but rather
represented Congress’s refusal to subsidize lobbying.113
The next year, in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California,114 the
Court invalidated a law that prohibited certain activity as a condition
to receipt of government subsidies.115 Specifically, Congress created
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting to subsidize noncommercial
television stations, but prohibited the stations from engaging in “editorializing.”116 The Court rejected the government’s argument that
this restriction simply reflected Congress’s refusal to fund editorializing, comparable to Congress’s refusal to fund lobbying in Taxation
with Representation.117 According to the Court, the main difference
here was that Congress’s attempt to curtail editorializing also limited
federal funds devoted to non-editorializing purposes.118 The Court
noted that Congress could remedy this prohibition in accordance with
Taxation with Representation by allowing the broadcasting stations to
create affiliate organizations that editorialized.119
Congress took the Court’s advice to allow such a segregation of
funds in Rust v. Sullivan,120 where the government prohibited organizational recipients of family planning funds from promoting abortion
109. See infra notes 110–135 and accompanying text.
110. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
111. Id. at 542, 548.
112. Id. at 544.
113. Id. at 545. In particular, the Court explained that non-profit organizations could
create separate entities to engage in lobbying, while still receiving the exemption for the
non-lobbying activities of their other entities. Id. at 544.
114. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
115. Id. at 399–400.
116. Id. at 366.
117. Id. at 399–400.
118. Id. at 400. To illustrate, the Court stated that a station that received only one percent of its funds from the government would be categorically prohibited from editorializing because it would have no way of segregating its use of federal funds, and would be
equally unable to raise private funds for purposes of editorializing. Id.
119. Id.
120. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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as an acceptable method of family planning.121 The Court rejected a
claim that the government had conditioned receipt of the subsidy on
project employees not exercising their First Amendment rights because the restraint applied only to specific project activities that the
subsidy funded.122 The Court maintained that the project workers
were free to express their opinions outside of these project activities
and, therefore, that the government had only controlled speech
within the context of a specific government-funded project.123
In contrast, when the government has disbursed funds to facilitate the speech of private citizens, the Court has restricted the government’s ability to regulate that speech.124 Rosenberger v. Rector of the
University of Virginia125 involved a university that prohibited a religiously affiliated student group from publishing a magazine using student funds.126 The Court characterized the university’s action as
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First
Amendment.127 The school’s policy fell outside of the protection that
Rust affords, the Court explained, because the student groups were
not speaking for the government, but rather, the government funding
was aimed at facilitating student speech.128 Thus, the Court held that
the government could not restrict the viewpoints of private speakers
by placing limits on funding aimed at facilitating such speech.129
The Court adopted a similar approach in Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez,130 where the federal government attempted to restrict the
ability of Legal Services Corporation (LSC) attorneys to litigate challenges to existing welfare laws.131 As it invalidated the restriction, the
Court took a narrow view of and distinguished Rust, stating that Rust
had not explicitly relied on the notion that the funding recipients’
speech amounted to governmental speech.132 Accordingly, the Court
121. Id. at 178.
122. Id. at 196 (“[H]ere the Government is not denying a benefit to anyone, but is
instead simply insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were
authorized.”).
123. Id. at 198–99.
124. Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995).
125. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
126. Id. at 822–23, 826.
127. Id. at 831.
128. Id. at 833–34.
129. Id. at 835.
130. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
131. Id. at 536–37.
132. Id. at 541, 549 (“The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale
that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to governmental
speech . . . .”).
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classified the LSC attorneys’ speech as private, not governmental.133
The Court also pointed out that the government had not put forth a
programmatic message to achieve its policy objectives here, as it had
in Rust.134 Thus, the Court found the LSC program analogous to Rosenberger, and struck down the law because the government funding
was not intended to promote a government message, but to facilitate
private speech.135
III.

THE COURT’S REASONING

In Garcetti v. Ceballos,136 the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and
held that a public employee’s statements made pursuant to his official
duties are not protected from employer discipline by the First Amendment.137 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy began by reiterating the notion that the First Amendment protects public employees
who speak as citizens addressing matters of public concern.138 Additionally, Justice Kennedy confirmed the need to, under Pickering, balance the government’s interests as an employer against the interests of
an employee who speaks as a citizen.139
In applying these principles to Ceballos’s speech, the Court explained that the critical point was that Ceballos made his speech pursuant to his official duties as a calendar deputy district attorney.140 As
a result, the Court reasoned that Ceballos had not spoken as a citizen.141 Instead, according to the Court, Ceballos had simply performed the duties that he was employed to perform.142 Thus, the
Court determined, Ceballos’s employer could control his speech because Ceballos spoke as a government prosecutor, rather than as a
private citizen, and a government employer may control speech that it
133. Id. at 542.
134. Id. at 548.
135. Id. at 542, 549.
136. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
137. Id. at 1960.
138. Id. at 1958.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1959–60. In articulating this key distinction, Justice Kennedy also noted two
facts that were not dispositive in Ceballos’s case. Id. at 1959. First, the fact that Ceballos
expressed his speech at work was not dispositive, the Court reasoned, because employees
may receive First Amendment protection when speaking in the office. Id. Second, the
Court explained that the fact that the subject matter of the memorandum related to Ceballos’s employment also was not dispositive. Id.
141. Id. at 1960.
142. Id.
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has commissioned.143 The Court, therefore, concluded that Ceballos
did not suffer unconstitutional retaliation.144
After enunciating this rule, the Court noted that the rule adequately protected an employee’s interest in speaking as a citizen and
society’s interest in having free and open public debate.145 To support this conclusion, the Court made clear that the inability to claim
First Amendment protection in these circumstances would not prevent employees from engaging in public debate.146 Additionally, the
Court reasoned that the rule sufficiently safeguarded an employer’s
right to control the speech of employees who act pursuant to their
duties.147 The Court, therefore, concluded that when an employee is
not speaking as a citizen, but rather as an employee pursuant to his
official duties, the application of the Pickering balancing test is
unnecessary.148
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that employers can restrict employees’ rights through broad job descriptions that expand
the scope of employees’ official duties.149 The Court explained that
formal job descriptions have little impact on a court’s inquiry into the
scope of employment.150 In addition, the Court declined to address
the new rule’s impact on academic freedom, opting instead to decide
the issue at a later time.151
143. Id. To illustrate this distinction, the Court differentiated Ceballos’s memorandum,
which he wrote as a prosecutor, from the speech at issue in Pickering—writing a letter to a
newspaper, which any private citizen could have done. Id.
144. Id. at 1961.
145. Id. at 1960.
146. Id. (“The employees retain the prospect of constitutional protection for their contributions to the civic discourse.”).
147. Id. According to the Court, an employer’s interest in controlling employee-created
speech in a professional forum is heightened due to the employer’s need to effectively and
consistently promote its mission. Id. The Court viewed Ceballos’s memorandum as an
example of a communication that entitled his supervisors to respond to it in evaluating his
performance as an employee. Id. at 1960–61.
148. Id. at 1961. The Court responded to the anomaly that the court of appeals asserted
would exist from this per se rule. Id. Specifically, the Court explained that when an employee speaks pursuant to his employment responsibilities, he does not engage in an activity in which private citizens engage and that could, as a result, receive First Amendment
protection. Id. In other words, the Court reasoned that when a public employee speaks,
“there is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government employees.”
Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1962.
151. Id. However, the Court noted that “[t]here is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional
interests.” Id.
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Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion to stress that employees
are still citizens when they are at work.152 He highlighted the Court’s
earlier silence as to whether individuals speak pursuant to their employment to demonstrate that the Court has considered this fact immaterial.153 Additionally, Justice Stevens voiced concern that the new
rule would encourage employees to speak publicly before talking to
their superiors.154
Justice Souter separately dissented on the basis that “private and
public interests in addressing official wrongdoing and threats to
health and safety can outweigh” a government employer’s substantial
interest in controlling its policies and objectives.155 Justice Souter
characterized the majority’s rule as arbitrary line drawing, and he argued that individual and societal interests do not decrease simply because speech is created in the course of an individual’s employment
duties.156 Moreover, he reasoned that public employees have a
heightened interest in their speech because they are especially concerned about public issues given their original motivation to work in
public service.157
Justice Souter also disputed the majority’s broad view that speech
made within the scope of public employment should be categorized as
the government’s own speech.158 He asserted that Ceballos was not
hired to promote a particular substantive view for the government,
and that the government does not possess plenary control over every
public employee’s speech.159 He further suggested that such a broad
view could allow the government to regulate the speech of university
152. Id. at 1963 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. Id. Specifically, Justice Stevens discussed Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School
District, 439 U.S. 410 (1979), as an example of when an employee privately expressed views
to her employer, but the Court did not rest its decision on whether the speech occurred
pursuant to her employment duties. Id. In other words, he criticized the majority’s rule
for withholding First Amendment protection from speech in some instances simply because it falls within an employee’s job description. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined Justice Souter’s
dissent. Id.
156. Id. at 1965. Justice Souter also warned that the majority’s new rule could undermine public employees’ First Amendment rights because employers may begin crafting
expansive descriptions of employees’ job duties. Id. at 1965 n.2. Through job descriptions
with more official duties, Justice Souter contended, government employers could severely
limit the universe of employee speech available for protection. Id.
157. Id. at 1966.
158. Id. at 1968.
159. Id. at 1969. In particular, Justice Souter argued that the majority misread Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), as giving the government such authority. Id. Instead, Justice
Souter viewed that case as limited to instances when the government appropriates funds
for a particular policy. Id.
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professors and threaten academic freedom as a result.160 To remedy
the shortcomings of the majority’s opinion, Justice Souter would have
undertaken a Pickering balancing of interests, but considered the employer’s interests to be heightened, given the employer’s need to control employee speech made in a professional capacity.161
In another dissent, Justice Breyer contended that speech created
pursuant to employment should be subjected to Pickering balancing
where: (1) a special demand for constitutional protection exists; (2)
governmental justifications may be limited; and (3) administrable
standards are available.162 He explained that the present case met
these requirements because the speech of lawyers is subject to independent regulation by the profession, and because a prosecutor has a
constitutional obligation to communicate exculpatory evidence to the
defense.163 Although he agreed with most of Justice Souter’s analysis
criticizing the majority’s per se rule, Justice Breyer believed that Justice Souter’s balancing approach failed to account properly for the
government’s heightened managerial and administrative concerns.164
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Garcetti v. Ceballos,165 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the First Amendment does not protect government employees’ speech if made within the scope of their employment.166 In so
holding, the Court misapplied the threshold inquiry of Connick167 and
misread the scope of Rust.168 Instead, the Court should have adopted
Justice Breyer’s standard, which would have safeguarded the constitutional mandate of Brady v. Maryland 169 and avoided any curtailment of
academic freedom.170
160. Id. at 1969–70.
161. Id. at 1967. Specifically, Justice Souter stated that “only comment on official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, or threats to
health and safety can weigh out in an employee’s favor.” Id.
162. Id. at 1974 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163. Id. (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
164. Id. at 1975. Specifically, Justice Breyer argued that Justice Souter’s formulation was
too broad because government employment typically involves protecting health and safety.
Id.
165. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
166. Id. at 1960.
167. See infra Part IV.A.
168. See infra Part IV.B.
169. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
170. See infra Part IV.C.
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The Court’s Adoption of a Bright-Line Rule Ignored Its Prior Flexible
Approach

In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court criticized
the Ninth Circuit’s application of precedent for too heavily focusing
on the content of employee speech and ignoring the citizen requirement.171 However, the creation of a bright-line rule that prevents any
speech created in the scope of employment from First Amendment
protection equally misreads precedent for three reasons.172 First,
such a rule ignores the factors that the Court has previously considered in determining whether an employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, including content, form, and context.173
Second, and similarly, the Court has consistently avoided brightline rules throughout its public employee speech jurisprudence.174
For example, the Court used fact-intensive criteria in Connick and rejected the rule that the dissenting justices had offered to define the
public concern requirement.175 Specifically, the dissenters contended
that statements should receive First Amendment protection based
solely on their content, without regard to the context and form factors.176 The Connick majority held, however, that context and form
allow the Court to consider an employee’s statement in each specific
instance.177 Likewise, in Givhan, a unanimous Court rejected another
bright-line rule that would have removed First Amendment protection
from all privately expressed statements.178 Instead, because the private setting of the statement could heighten the employer’s interest,
the Court evaluated multiple factors to determine whether the speech
warranted protection, and did not foreclose the inquiry entirely based
on an arbitrary, rigid distinction.179 Furthermore, the Court has also
171. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1956–57.
172. See infra notes 173–198 and accompanying text.
173. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (per curiam) (explaining that
the Court examines the content, form, and context of a statement to determine if it
touches on a matter of public concern); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384–85
(1987) (same); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983) (same).
174. See infra notes 175–182 and accompanying text.
175. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8.
176. See id. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that whether a statement touches
on a matter of public concern should not depend on where it is said or why).
177. See id. at 148 n.8 (majority opinion) (focusing the inquiry on whether a particular
questionnaire touched on a matter of public concern, and not on whether it could have
touched on a matter of public concern in a different situation).
178. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979) (rejecting the
lower court’s view that a categorical distinction existed between a public employee who
spoke publicly and one who communicated privately with her employer).
179. See id. at 415 n.4 (listing manner, time, and place as additional factors for the Court
to assess besides content).
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extended Pickering to disputes between government employers and independent contractors, rather than categorically excluding contractors from First Amendment protection.180 In refusing to adopt such a
bright-line rule, the Court stated that foreclosing First Amendment
protection based on formal labels, such as “independent contractor”
or “employee,” undermined First Amendment rights.181 In doing so,
the Court found the Pickering balancing test to be a “nuanced approach” that is “superior to a bright-line rule.”182 These instances
demonstrate the Court’s preference for flexible judicial inquiries
when First Amendment rights are at stake, and in rejecting such an
inquiry, the Garcetti Court misapplied the Connick threshold.
Third, the Court’s preclusion of any inquiry into whether an employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern while performing official duties also ignored precedent that has valued public
employees’ individual interests as well as the societal interest in their
speech.183 By excluding this class of speech from protection, the
Court overlooked an individual’s ability to speak as an employee and a
citizen simultaneously.184 Because of their positions, public employees are uniquely qualified to contribute to public debate when speaking as individuals;185 however, the Court’s rule failed to consider
employees’ interests in engaging in public speech related to their
work. Similarly, this distinction also disregards the societal interest in
benefitting from the unique expertise of public employees.186 In categorically removing employee speech from First Amendment protec180. See Bd. of County Comm’rs, Wabaunsee County v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 677
(1996) (extending Pickering to relationships between independent contractors and the government because the balancing framework accommodates the varied interests of each
party).
181. See id. at 678–79 (noting that resolving constitutional claims on such distinctions “is
an enterprise that [the Court has] consistently eschewed”).
182. Id. at 678.
183. See infra notes 184–198 and accompanying text.
184. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1966–67 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that employees also speak as citizens, for example, when “a public auditor speaks on his
discovery of embezzlement of public funds, when a building inspector makes an obligatory
report of an attempt to bribe him, or when a law enforcement officer expressly balks at a
superior’s order to violate constitutional rights he is sworn to protect”).
185. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“Government employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which
they work . . . . And a government employee, like any citizen, may have a strong, legitimate
interest in speaking out on public matters.”); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572
(1968) (“Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions . . . . Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out
freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”).
186. See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam) (“The interest at stake is as much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the em-
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tion, the Court has threatened society’s access to information that may
contribute to a robust, public debate.187
The Court has previously found the individual and societal interests to be so important that, when sufficiently heightened, they alter
the framework with which the Court determines when speech touches
on a matter of public concern.188 Specifically, in Connick, the Court
held that the content of one question concerning political pressure
constituted a matter of public concern while the other questions on
the questionnaire did not, even though they all arose in the same
form and context.189 The Court’s reasoning, therefore, suggested
that the content of a statement can dwarf the context and form factors
when the content involves enhanced individual and societal
interests.190
By the same token, the content of Ceballos’s speech specifically
implicated weighty individual and societal interests.191 Ceballos
worked in his position because of his “personal commitment to perform civic work,”192 and, therefore, he had a particular interest in ensuring that his work served the public.193 Furthermore, the
constitutional mandate of Brady v. Maryland194 compelled Ceballos to
ployee’s own right to disseminate it.”); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571–72 (finding that “free and
open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate”).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 470 (1995)
(noting that a disincentive to government employee speech inhibits the public’s ability to
hear the speech); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983) (finding that speech concerning pressure on employees to work in political campaigns “is a matter of interest to the
community”).
188. See infra notes 189–190 and accompanying text.
189. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–49 (finding that the questionnaire on the whole
emerged in the context of an employment dispute, but that one question qualified as
touching on a matter of public concern).
190. See id. at 149 (explaining that the individual and societal interests that the content
of one question raised were sufficiently heightened to override the fact that the questionnaire arose in the context of an employment dispute).
Additionally, the Connick Court asserted that Givhan did not reflect a personal employment dispute and concluded that the content of protesting racial discrimination was “a
matter inherently of public concern.” Id. at 148 n.8. In dissent, Justice Brennan argued
that the Court had, thus, created two categories of speech that touch on matters of public
concern: (1) where the speech so touches as a result of content, context, and form; and (2)
where the speech so touches because its subject matter is “inherently of public concern.”
Id. at 159–60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191. See infra notes 192–195 and accompanying text.
192. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1971 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 1966 & n.4 (noting that the district attorney’s office that employed Ceballos
and the federal government each seek employees who are motivated to serve the public,
and that public employees enjoy the personal satisfaction that flows from that service).
194. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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provide exculpatory evidence to the defense and increased society’s
interest in his speech as a result.195
Instead of adequately considering these heightened interests, the
Court barred any inquiry into them and essentially created a new
threshold inquiry, based on scope of employment, that courts must
consider before they can reach the Connick question.196 By solely emphasizing the employer’s interest to the exclusion of these personal
and societal interests, the Court overlooked the ability of the Pickering
balancing test, after satisfaction of the Connick inquiry, to effectively
consider an employer’s heightened interest in certain employment
contexts.197 Because the Court is already well-versed in evaluating
these interests, whether speech touches on a matter of public concern, and whether an employee speaks as a citizen, it can conduct
equally thoughtful Pickering and Connick evaluations when the speech
occurs during the course of employment.198
B. The Court Misread and Expanded the Government’s Ability to
Control Government-Funded Speech
In addition to improperly adopting a bright-line rule contrary to
precedent, the Garcetti Court wrongly adopted a broad view of the government’s ability to control speech it funds.199 In reasoning that the
government has plenary control over the speech of its employees,200
the Court misinterpreted its jurisprudence in this area, which simply
allows the government to regulate the content of speech when it
funds a project aimed at promoting a specific policy objective.201 Al195. See id. at 87 (“Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal
trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated
unfairly.”).
196. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961 (explaining that when an employee speaks pursuant
to his job duties, judicial scrutiny of the employer’s decision becomes unnecessary).
197. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390 (1987) (varying the employer’s
interest based on the responsibilities and authority of the employee); Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570 & n.3 (1968) (suggesting that employment relationships that are
of a personal and intimate nature or involve confidentiality may require significantly different considerations when balancing the interests).
198. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1967 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the existing
Pickering framework can accommodate the adjusted interests).
199. See infra notes 200–210 and accompanying text.
200. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960 (explaining that government restriction of speech
made pursuant to official employment duties was constitutional because it merely reflected
the employer’s control over speech it had commissioned).
201. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991) (“[H]ere the Government is not
denying a benefit to anyone, but is instead simply insisting that public funds be spent for
the purposes for which they were authorized.”).
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though the Garcetti Court interpreted Rosenberger as expanding Rust,202
Velazquez directly questioned this view.203 Specifically, Velazquez, decided six years after Rosenberger, adopted a limited view of Rust and
held that the speech of government-funded Legal Services Corporation attorneys was private because the attorneys were not charged with
promoting a specific governmental message.204
Nevertheless, the Garcetti Court ignored this development—that
not every recipient of federal funds, or government employee, should
be considered as per se speaking for the government.205 Ceballos’s
position is analogous to that of the lawyer in Velazquez because the
government did not condition either lawyer’s paycheck on the promotion of a specific policy message.206 The fact that the government did
not hire Ceballos to promote a specific, governmental message, but
instead to prosecute cases within the confines of the law, distinguishes
this case from Rust and similar precedent, where the speaker in question was hired to promote a particular message.207 Additionally, like
the LSC attorneys in Velazquez, Ceballos lacked the ability to channel
his speech, here his exercise of the Brady obligation, to another forum
outside of the legal system.208 Thus, the rule acted as a restriction on
Ceballos as an individual rather than a restriction on any funded activities, and the Court has explicitly found such restrictions on an individual’s speech to be unconstitutional.209 Furthermore, Ceballos’s
202. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960 (relying on Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 833 (1995), and holding that when the government appropriates public funds it can
control the speech it has created).
203. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (explaining that Rust
did not rely on labeling the project participants’ activities as governmental speech).
204. Id. at 541–42.
205. Compare Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960 (explaining that the government hired and paid
Ceballos to speak as a prosecutor and, as a result, characterizing his speech as governmental), with Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542 (explaining that the speech of a government-funded
Legal Services Corporation attorney could not be classified as governmental speech).
206. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1969 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that Ceballos was
hired to enforce the law rather than perform a “speaking assignment” for the government); Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542 (explaining that the LSC program facilitated private
speech and did not promote a governmental message).
207. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1969 (Souter, J., dissenting); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
196 (1991).
208. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 546–47 (explaining that no alternative channel existed for
expression of legal theories aside from litigation).
It should also be noted that the ethical rules that govern the legal profession prevent
prosecutors from speaking in public about many issues related to pending cases. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2007) (describing a prosecutor’s ethical duties concerning trial publicity).
209. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 399–401 (1984)
(invalidating a restriction on an organization’s right to engage in prohibited speech
outside of the federally funded program); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash.,
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speech was constitutionally compelled under Brady, and speech cannot be said to be commissioned by an employer where the Constitution requires it.210 For these reasons, the Court should have applied
the limited view of Rust consistent with Velazquez, instead of adopting
the blanket claim that all employee speech made in the course of employment is governmental speech.
C. Justice Breyer’s Standard Properly Adheres to Precedent
Unlike the majority’s bright-line rule, Justice Breyer’s standard is
consistent with the flexible approach of the Connick-Pickering case law,
as well as the Court’s narrow interpretation of Rust.211 Justice Breyer’s
approach should have been adopted not only because it follows precedent, but also because it protects speech in areas that require special
constitutional consideration.212
Instead of adopting the majority’s bright-line rule, Justice
Breyer’s dissent advocated a fact-dependent inquiry that would have
adhered to Connick.213 Because Justice Breyer would have undertaken
a Pickering balancing under certain conditions, his standard would still
have first conducted the Connick public concern inquiry, but would
then appropriately have emphasized the augmented interest of employers in controlling public employee speech.214 As Justice Breyer
noted, however, when speech requires special constitutional protection, the government’s interest in controlling that speech is reduced
and the balance may then tip in favor of the employee.215 Therefore,
461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (finding the denial of tax exempt status permissible because the
organizations could segregate their funded activities and still engage in the speech).
210. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1974–75 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that Ceballos’s
speech was constitutionally mandated and, thus, the government’s interest in controlling
the speech was significantly diminished); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the Constitution requires a prosecutor to provide exculpatory evidence to the
accused).
211. See infra notes 213–220 and accompanying text.
212. See infra notes 221–229 and accompanying text.
213. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1973–74 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s
rule as too absolute and suggesting analysis on a case-by-case basis).
214. See id. at 1973–75 (applying Pickering where “circumstances with special demand for
constitutional protection of the speech at issue [exist], where governmental justifications
may be limited, and where administrable standards seem readily available,” but explaining
that the government needs to be able to direct speech that is part of an employee’s duties).
Thus, Justice Breyer’s standard would have limited the content that could qualify for
Pickering balancing, unlike Justice Souter’s adjusted rule. Compare id. at 1967 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (proposing comments on dishonesty, unconstitutional action, or threats to
health and safety as a screen for subject matter), with id. at 1975 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that Justice Souter’s proposal would screen little because government administration typically involves threats to health and safety).
215. Id. at 1974–75 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Justice Breyer’s approach, unlike the majority’s rule, properly applies
precedent, allowing the flexibility of a fact-dependent Connick inquiry
and appropriately considering the individual and societal interests at
stake under Pickering.216
Justice Breyer’s framework also properly rejected the majority’s
expansive view of Rust217—that the government can control all speech
made in the course of public employment.218 Rather than labeling
Ceballos’s speech as governmental, Justice Breyer explained that statements of lawyers constitute professional speech, which is independently regulated and, thus, involves a reduced governmental interest
in regulating that speech.219 He also relied on Velazquez to illustrate
that restricting attorneys’ speech distorts the legal system “by altering
the traditional role of the attorneys.”220 As a result, Justice Breyer’s
framework avoids the majority’s misguided application of Rust.
Finally, Justice Breyer’s standard would have adequately protected Brady’s constitutional mandate, as well as speech related to academic freedom, because they demand special constitutional
consideration.221 For example, Ceballos’s speech constituted speech
of special constitutional concern because Brady mandates the
prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory evidence to the defense.222
Justice Breyer’s standard would, therefore, have encompassed Ceballos’s speech.223 Furthermore, Justice Breyer’s framework would have
also safeguarded the traditionally broad protection of academic freedom, which the majority’s reasoning could undermine.224 The First
Amendment has a long history of vigorously protecting the integrity of

216. See id. at 1975 (stating that the Pickering balancing test should apply when certain
conditions are met).
217. See supra notes 199–210 and accompanying text (describing the shortcomings of
the majority’s approach on this issue).
218. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1974 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s absolute rule that all public employee speech is governmental speech).
219. Id.
220. Id. (quoting Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001)).
221. See infra notes 222–226 and accompanying text.
222. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1974 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that Ceballos’s
speech was constitutionally mandated); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). As another example of a constitutional obligation, Justice Breyer described a prison doctor who
could be professionally obligated to report unsafe conditions in prison cells. Garcetti, 126
S. Ct. at 1974–75 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
223. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1974–75 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
224. See id. at 1969 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s notion of the
government’s plenary authority to control public employee speech could endanger the
speech of public university professors).
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academic freedom,225 and this important interest is a relevant factor
to include in the Pickering balancing. Such speech would, therefore,
properly receive protection under Justice Breyer’s more flexible balancing approach.226
In applying this standard, Justice Breyer announced that Ceballos’s speech met the requirements to warrant the Pickering balancing
test.227 Specifically, Justice Breyer’s framework recognized Ceballos’s
speech as the professional speech of a lawyer, and, additionally, that
Ceballos spoke pursuant to his Brady obligation.228 As a result, Justice
Breyer properly concluded that these factors diminished the government’s interest in controlling Ceballos’s speech and necessitated application of the Pickering balancing.229
V.

CONCLUSION

In Garcetti v. Ceballos,230 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that government employees are not entitled to First Amendment
protection for speech made pursuant to their official duties.231 In doing so, the Court ignored the standards articulated in its precedent,232
and adopted an overly expansive view of what constitutes governmental speech.233 Instead, the Court should have adopted Justice Breyer’s
framework, which properly adhered to precedent and would have offered protection to employee speech that demands special constitutional protection.234
MATTHEW R. SCHROLL

225. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995) (explaining that the danger of chilling individual expression is especially acute in the university setting); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (noting that “the university is a
traditional sphere of free expression”).
226. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1974 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that Pickering
should be applied to speech with a special demand for constitutional protection).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1975.
230. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
231. Id. at 1960.
232. See supra Part IV.A.
233. See supra Part IV.B.
234. See supra Part IV.C.
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